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CROSS-CUTTING LEGISLATION AND THE IMPACT OF COMMITTEE REFORM ON THE PURSUIT OF BLACK INTERESTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Abstract: The value of increased diversity in lawmaking bodies and the reconciliation such increases with a perceived lack of substantive policy gains by Black representatives has been at the center of scholarly debate for several decades. Increasingly, scholars have argued, it may be necessary move beyond examinations of voting behavior to identify where members of color represent the interests of their unique constituencies. This analysis seeks to explore the strategy surrounding Black lawmakers effort to shape the legislative agenda in the House of Representatives and how institutional change over time may have impacted their probability of success. More specifically, through an evaluation of bill success from the 103rd to the 112th Congress, I find a positive influence of sponsoring bills that result in multiple committee referrals on the likelihood of bill success at the committee stage and in floor votes. These successes span across the broader sponsorship of Black members as well as in policy areas targeted by the Congressional Black Caucus. I also find that such conditions were not the case prior to a series of reforms that rearranged policy jurisdictions and referee procedures.
Un-equal opportunity lawmaking:AGENDA DENIAL AND THE DISPROPORTIONATE FILTERING OF MINORITY ISSUES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Abstract: Despite an increase in minority representation within the halls of Congress, questions remain as to if such proportional gains will translate into substantive policy wins. Are underlying forces at play that work against policy change for Black lawmakers? To examine this question, I explore the process of ``winnowing" - a necessary, but discriminant function of lawmaking institutions that must prioritize certain issues over others in an effort to process the multitude of signals in the environment while coping with limited time, resources, and attention spans. Are certain subgroups of lawmakers disproportionately disadvantaged by the winnowing process? I argue that in an effort to partake in low-cost policy making, mitigate conflict, and preserve power structures, American policymaking institutions are incentivized to de-prioritize minority issues. This exploration of bill sponsorship from the 103rd - 112th congresses finds a great deal of support for that assumption. Bills sponsored in policy areas identified by the Congressional Black Caucus as central to their legislative agenda are subject to a disproportionate degree of filtration at the committee stage. In addition, a number of avenues found to increase a bill's prospects for advancement through the committee phase of the legislative process - including leadership, placement on committees with jurisdiction over policy areas of interest and majority control - are ineffective for CBC members and the issues they pursue. Minority lawmakers face two layers of friction that work against policy change: institutional friction and meso-level friction within its own party.
OLD POLICY, NEW POLITICS: A LESSON OF INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY DRIFT FROM THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION
Schattsneider's now-foundational commentary, asserting that ``new policies create new politics", certainly captures the nature of legislating in this modern political atmosphere. The ruling invalidating Section 4 and effectively grounding one of the major enforcement mechanism in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) will likely have long-term ramifications on American electoral processes. The John Roberts-authored majority ruling outlined how a broken process of policy evaluation and updating culminated in the Court finding the coverage formula - designed in the earliest versions of the Act - antiquated. What lessons can be derived from the Court decision in Shelby v. Holder? I find that the current iteration of the Voting Rights Act, or the remnants of the Act that remains after Shelby is the product of a perfect storm of two forms of drift - endogenous and exogenous - and their imposition of these costs on an institution and its actors, complicating the furtherance of a temporary piece of legislation.